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Reviewed by Duncan Farthing-Nichol
In The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy of James M Landis, Justin O’Brien asks
why Harvard Law School has so far neglected to hang its portrait of James
M. Landis (11). The library’s walls bow under the weight of history; Harvard’s
twentieth-century deans gaze down en masse from the south end. But Landis,
dean from 1937 to 1946, is not among them.1 Professor O’Brien traces the
omission to Landis’ 1963 conviction for tax avoidance, a crime for which Landis
was sentenced to thirty days in jail. The school, according to O’Brien, has let
the conviction overshadow Landis’ vital role in shaping law and government.
O’Brien reminds readers that Landis wrote and administered the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—the ﬁrst serious eﬀorts
at federal securities regulation—and, in 1938, developed the most persuasive
contemporary theory of government by administrative agency. The University
of New South Wales professor also contends that Landis introduced social
responsibility to legal education, an achievement that elevated law from a mere
technical discipline to a means of seeking justice. Harvard, O’Brien concludes,
should hang its Landis portrait.
I agree, but on somewhat diﬀerent grounds. O’Brien lays a compelling
case for Landis’ impact on administrative thought and practice. He moves
too quickly, however, in naming Landis a transformative ﬁgure in legal
education. Landis spoke in ambitious terms: He aimed for a legal education
that transcended technique, reﬂected the rise of public law, and respected
the new experts (economists, sociologists, and other specialists). He sought
to instill a desire for justice in his students. Yet Landis did relatively little
to institutionalize that vision, acting more as a caretaker than a reformer. If
Harvard should hang Landis’ portrait, it is for his ideas and his story, rather
than his deeds.
Duncan Farthing-Nichol is the Research and Policy Associate at the MaRS Centre for Impact
Investing and a graduate of Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Professor Daniel R.
Coquillette for his wise and patient guidance, and to Ms. Erin Flanagan for her close eye, rigorous
argument, and enduring support.
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Derek Bok, dean for two and a half years before his promotion to University President in
1971, is the only other face missing from the library’s south end.
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In the Government Trenches
Born in 1899, Landis ranked ﬁrst at Princeton College and at Harvard Law
School, and by the late 1920s had already started to make his name as one of
the brightest lawyers of his generation. His fascination with legislation led
him, in 1933, from the Harvard faculty to New Deal Washington. Professor
Felix Frankfurter, Landis’ mentor, had recruited him to help redraft the
securities legislation then foundering in Congress. Landis, together with
Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen (two other young sparks of President
Roosevelt’s expansive brain trust), rewrote the bill, changing its focus from
the investment quality of securities to disclosure about securities.
The change signiﬁcantly curtailed administrative inﬂuence. Landis,
Corcoran, and Cohen removed the administrative power to forbid honest sale
of a worthless security, leaving only the power to compel disclosure before
selling the security. Landis did not think any government agency should (or
could) say whether an investor should buy a security. Rather, the most an
agency could do was make sure the investor had the right information to judge
for him- or herself (29-30).
The disclosure paradigm and Landis’ role in developing and administering
that paradigm, in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, form the core of Professor O’Brien’s book. O’Brien is an expert
on ﬁnancial regulation. He has published extensively on capital market
governance. He seeks from Landis insight into modern problems of ﬁnance.
That modern focus is O’Brien’s contribution to the Landis literature. Landis
is the subject of one other book-length biography, Donald Ritchie’s James
M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators (1980), and he occupies a quarter of another
book, Thomas K. McCraw’s Prophets of Regulation (1984). Donald Ritchie’s
excellent biography explores a complex man rich in ideas and relationships;
it does not attempt to draw contemporary lessons. Thomas McCraw mines
Landis’ regulatory projects and political ﬁghts, but he does not invoke Landis’
strategies to solve present-day ﬁnancial problems.
O’Brien, by contrast, looks to Landis for precisely those solutions. He
spends great energy on the failings of modern ﬁnancial regulation, fulminating
against bankers’ suspect morality and governments’ ineﬀective containment.
In his view, neither rules nor principles by themselves can produce a stable
ﬁnancial system. Rules are too easy to avoid and principles too hard to deﬁne.
A culture of technical compliance has created the rickety system now in place.
According to O’Brien, the economy can only hope for a ﬁnancial system less
prone to scandal and catastrophe when the players accept moral responsibility
for their actions.
Professor O’Brien argues that Landis intended the disclosure requirement
to induce just that sort of moral responsibility. Informing investors was
a secondary aim; in greater part, Landis insisted on disclosure to convince
companies of their public responsibilities. O’Brien writes that “[a]t its core,
disclosure is a normative demand, a point explicitly made by its original

664

Journal of Legal Education

framers. Demanding truth in securities is a moral claim” (166). A corporation
that discloses the bare minimum has lost the thread. As imagined by Landis,
disclosure is not about technical compliance but about diﬀusing a spirit of
honesty and fair dealing. O’Brien closes his book by warning regulators and
ﬁnanciers that stability will remain a historical curiosity unless they instill that
spirit into the culture of modern ﬁnance.
While O’Brien concentrates his attention on ﬁnancial regulation and
the disclosure paradigm, he also writes of Landis’ broader inﬂuence on the
theory and practice of regulation. Landis published two core texts of the
administrative state. In 1938, he wrote The Administrative Process, a sweeping
argument advocating regulation as the solution to the industrial world’s
complex problems. In 1960, he wrote the Report on Regulatory Agencies to the
President-Elect, an analysis of regulatory failings and a set of recommendations to
President-elect John F. Kennedy. Together, the works track Landis’ changing
views as the administrative agencies he held in such high regard declined into
a morass of incompetence and delay.
McCraw hails The Administrative State as “the most forceful argument ever
written in favor of regulation.”2 In The Administrative Process, Landis describes
the administrative agencies as a necessary response to the rise of economic
interdependence and democratic government. As industry became more
complex and economic relationships more numerous, legislatures and the
courts lost the ability to regulate the economy. Yet, at the same time, the public
demanded government accountability for the economy’s growth and collateral
damage.3 Out of this untenable situation emerged the administrative agency.4
Practicality was the agency’s touchstone: “[A] government had to be provided
to direct and control . . . industry, and governance as a practical matter implied
not merely legislative power or simply executive power, but whatever power
might be required to achieve the desired results.”5
One of the administrative branch’s greatest virtues was its concentration
of industry- and issue-speciﬁc expertise. Judges were “jacks-of-all-trades and
masters of none”; by contrast, administrators “devote[d] ﬁfty-two weeks a
year, year after year, to a particular problem.”6 Moreover, the problems of
industry “call[ed] not only for legal intelligence but also wisdom in the ways
of industrial operation”—wisdom found not in the judiciary but rather in the
specialized branches and varied experts of the administrative state.7
The Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect opens with a litany of
complaints against, among other things, the competence of many of those
2.

THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 212 (1984).

3.

JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7-9 (1938).

4.

Id. at 11-12.

5.

Id. at 10.

6.

Id. at 23, 31.
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Id. at 31.
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apparent experts.8 The Report repeats The Administrative Process’ insistence that
government in the industrial age requires administrative agencies.9 The Report
does not, however, echo with the same optimism and faith in agency rule.
Instead, it recognizes that administrative agencies only work with good people,
adequate budgets, and political attention—and that without those elements,
agencies can impose heavy costs on industry and the public.
Landis, however, had not yet reached those last conclusions when he was
dean of Harvard Law School. Landis took the deanship in 1937 and wrote The
Administrative Process in 1938. Just oﬀ the height of his government career, he still
retained his idealistic conviction in the administrative process. If he was to
force a break with the technical, private law roots of the school, here was his
moment.
Back to the Ivory Tower
Harvard President James Conant labeled the Harvard Law faculty of the
mid-1930s “the most quarrelsome group of men I ever encountered.”10 The
quarrels pitted Dean Roscoe Pound, a dictatorial dean already two decades
in oﬃce, against a group of faculty led by Professor Frankfurter.11 When the
rifts began to threaten the school’s administration, the Harvard Corporation
passed a retirement rule to force the aging Pound out of oﬃce, and President
Conant went on the hunt for someone who could knit the Faculty back
together.12 After two outsiders declined the job, Conant turned to Landis.13
The deanship required both a peacemaker and a visionary. Legal education
stood ripe for reform. Outside the academy, the administrative state continued
to rise out of the Depression’s ashes. Legal education could no longer relegate
public law to the periphery. Just after his appointment, Landis emphasized
public law’s new prestige: “It is not going to make any diﬀerence who controls
the Government in Washington. . . . [T]he pervasive character of government
will continue. . . . All of this must reﬂect itself in today’s legal training.”14
Inside the academy, legal realism continued its assault on the legal
formalism often associated with Harvard. Pound took particular exception
to its inroads: “[M]y chief reason for giving up the Deanship is that I do not
care to be responsible for teaching that law is simply a pious fraud to cover up
decisions of cases according to personal inclinations or that there is nothing in
8.
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the way of reason back of the legal order but it is simply a pulling and hauling
of interests with a camouﬂage of authoritative precepts.”15
Legal realism argued that personal beliefs and idiosyncrasies play a
dominant role in the way judges decide cases, and that doctrinal reasoning
is often just a rationalization of judicial bias.16 Realist professors taught that
judicial decisions, though written to suggest reliance on widely applicable
legal concepts, actually turn on sympathies in the facts. Realists therefore
recommended reordering courses around related facts (a structure known
as functionalism) rather than around legal concepts.17 Realists also rejected
law’s isolation from the social sciences, calling instead for recognition of social
scientiﬁc inﬂuence on law and for social scientiﬁc courses in law school.18
Landis rode into Cambridge at a moment of contest at Harvard Law School
and in legal education. Yet while the disquiet made room for change, Landis
did not have a free hand. First, a dean is not a dictator, despite Pound’s
tendencies. Second, the faculty had just ﬁnished reforming the curriculum in
spring 1937 (while Landis was still away in Washington),19 and Harvard Law
School is not a place of frequent curricular experiment. With the exception
of Criminal Law, private law courses ﬁlled every slot in the new curriculum’s
ﬁrst two years.20 If Landis’ record in Cambridge was to match his record in
Washington, he would have to move boldly.
Transformer or Tinkerer?
Landis, according to Professor O’Brien, moved boldly. O’Brien says Landis
“transform[ed] the form, content and purpose of legal education” (12). He
cites speeches and letters in which Landis calls for lawyers trained for an
administrative machinery that does not rely on legal technique alone. He
argues that Landis, through legal education, strove “to impregnate the major
law ﬁrms with enhanced social consciousness” (106). As Landis sought by
disclosure to instill a sense of social obligation in companies, so he sought by
legal education to instill a sense of social obligation in lawyers.
O’Brien is on ﬁrm ground in describing Landis’ ambitions. His thesis
wobbles somewhat in describing Landis’ accomplishments. Take, for example,
the place of public law in the curriculum. As a premier administrator in the
New Deal and a vocal advocate of public law in legal education, Landis might
have been expected to expand the curriculum’s public law content. Yet public
15.

LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1937-1960 57 (1986) (quoting Letter from Roscoe
Pound, former Dean, Harvard Law Sch., to Spier Whitaker (Sept. 8, 1936) (on ﬁle with the
Harvard University Archives, Dean’s Files)).

16.

Id. at 6-7.

17.

Id. at 29, 70.

18.

Id. at 43.

19.

James M. Landis & Sidney Post Simpson, The New Curriculum of the Harvard Law School, 51
HARV. L. REV. 965, 968 (1938).

20.

Id. at 975-79.

Book Review: The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy of James M Landis

667

law hardly advanced during his tenure. The school tweaked the curriculum in
only two relevant ways: It added Administrative Law as a third-year elective
(it was only available as a graduate seminar when Landis took over), and it
developed a Federal Administration graduate seminar.21 A student of the early
1940s could expect almost no greater exposure to the workings of government
than a student of the mid-1930s, even if the student sought out public law
courses.
O’Brien emphasizes Landis’ letters and speeches in which he encourages
prospective law students to indulge in a breadth of courses before settling
into a narrowing professional degree (99, 106). A student broadly educated
in college would less likely learn law as merely a technical discipline. Landis,
however, far from requiring a diverse college degree for admission, did not
even publish his recommendations in the school’s register.22 Most prospective
students probably never learned that an eclectic education would serve better
than one tightly tailored to “pre-law” subjects.23
Landis’ only programmatic eﬀort to expand the minds of college students
was the Seven-Year Plan. Beginning in 1941-42, a Harvard College student
could enroll in the Seven-Year Plan instead of choosing a college major. The
student would complete three wide-ranging years at the Faculty of Arts and
Sciences, move to the law school for year four and most of year ﬁve, and then
spend years six and seven ﬁnishing his law courses and concentrating on
modern problems in the ﬁeld of his choice.24 The ﬁrst three years permitted
an “acquaintance with and appreciation of the many facets of life and thought
[that] are as essential to the making of a great lawyer as pure professional
equipment.”25
The Seven-Year Plan, while a heady concept, never attracted more than a
handful of students in its decade of life. The Plan was Landis’ most signiﬁcant
concession to those who clamored for greater social scientiﬁc content in law
school, and yet it still kept the social sciences out of the LL.B. proper. When
in early 1940 Professor Erwin Griswold suggested that the school let students
21.
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22.
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take up to two non-law courses for LL.B. credit, Landis turned him down.26
The 1946 Spring-Summer Register, the last register before Landis left Harvard,
allowed law students to take courses in other university departments, but not
for credit.27 The very next register, the ﬁrst of Griswold’s deanship, granted
third-year students up to six hours of credit for work in other departments.28
Landis, despite a desire to avoid narrow lawyers, recoiled from anything that
smacked of “dilettantism.”29
In contrast to his rapid overhaul in Washington, Landis moved slowly
in tilting against Harvard’s traditions, even against those most disgraceful.
Landis owns the black mark of the last dean to refuse to admit women.
Harvard kept to the barricades much longer than others: Yale yielded in 1886,
Stanford in 1895 and Columbia in 1928.30 As the 1930s drew to a close and
Langdell Hall still housed only suits and ties, the school began to look like a
relic. No one did anything (except Professor Zechariah Chafee, who lobbied
persistently to admit women) until late 1942. That fall, as World War II sent
enrollment plummeting and the school’s accounts into a shambles, the faculty
voted ﬁfteen to eleven to admit women. Landis voted to admit.31 But the
faculty never sent the recommendation to the Harvard Corporation (which
held ultimate control over the decision), because the vote was so close on “so
fundamental a question.”32 That poor excuse for inaction became even poorer
as the post-war winds favored admitting women. Yet still Landis delayed.33
26.
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Despite such ﬂaws, Landis did not fail as dean. He recruited excellent
faculty: Andrew James Casner, Lon Fuller, Paul Freund, and Milton Katz
in 1940, and David Cavers, Robert Bowie, Mark De Wolfe Howe, Robert
Braucher, and Archibald Cox in 1944-45. He balanced the books and stashed
a small surplus before the war wrecked the school’s ﬁnances. In one of his
most farsighted proposals, he introduced the written work requirement that
still dogs (and sometimes inspires) Harvard Law students today. In that last
move, he started to connect the practice of legal education to his dream of
something greater:
Too many men graduate from the School who are competent enough but who
have failed to catch a glimpse of the law as a means for more eﬀective living.
The zest that may develop from individual research, as well as the discipline
necessarily engendered by its pursuit, may instill a desirable discontent with
a mere vocational attitude towards the study of law. It has a tendency to
breed a sense of consecration to the acquisition of knowledge because of the
conviction that the things for which one delves are important for the world
to know.34

While Landis did not fail, neither did he transform. In part, he may have
been too concerned about interfering with the school’s technical training.
All lawyers, Landis stressed, must master the fundamentals—for “you cannot
make good reformers out of poor lawyers.”35 He would not introduce changes
that might risk the school’s tradition of technical excellence. More important,
I think, Landis simply was not around long enough, his already brief nineyear term between 1937 and 1946 made shorter by World War II.36 Landis left
the school in January 1942 to serve in government, and did not return until
January 1945 (most students and professors served, leaving the school with a
skeleton crew during the war). The problem of integrating droves of soldierstudents absorbed nearly all his time in 1945 and 1946.37
Landis took a moment in those last years to divine the future. He
recognized that legal education after the war must change. In laying out
Landis’ educational legacy, O’Brien stresses the post-war Committee on Legal
Education (107-08). Landis appointed the committee to survey legal education
and devise a plan for its improvement. The rise of the administrative state,
the rise of expertise, and a worldwide bloodbath could not go by without
34.
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12, 1940, at 224, 230.
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Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1937, at 11.

36.
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comment. Legal education had to build lawyers both stronger in skills properly
“legal” and smarter in recognizing and enlisting other professions’ expertise.38
The Committee’s product, the Preliminary Statement of the Committee on
Legal Education, helped guide Harvard through the post-war period.39 But
Landis had already left by then, lured away to chair the Civil Aeronautics
Board in Washington. The siren call of government, which had distracted
Landis even before Pearl Harbor, tempted him from a job he no longer found
interesting.40 Moreover, Landis’ marriage lay broken, and he was having a toopublic aﬀair with his secretary—a tricky situation in 1940s Cambridge.41 Veteran
Professor Austin Scott, acting on pressure from Visiting Committee members
and likely his own disapproval, seems to have asked President Conant and
the Harvard Corporation to coax Landis out.42 As in his conviction for tax
avoidance (a crime of procrastination, not greed), Landis’ personal disarray
caught up with his professional life, ruining both.
A Life’s Lessons
Judge Henry Friendly described Landis as “the most wasted life of our
time.”43 Friendly overshot, but his remark rings with some truth as applied to
Landis’ deanship. Landis, recruited from a top Washington post as the New
Deal shook assumptions about law and government, had the talent and the
ideas to reshape legal education. He articulated a vision of a lawyer who knows
his place in the administrative scheme and who understands that expertise is
not property of lawyers alone—that the judge as general statesman belongs to
another era. As O’Brien explains, Landis wanted to give his students more
than just technical ability (as important as technical ability remained). He
wanted them to see law as an instrument by which they might discover better
ways of living.
Had he stayed to implement the Committee on Legal Education’s
recommendations, Landis might have achieved more of that vision. Still, even
38.
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in his short tenure, he left an impression. In 1990, Professor Paul Freund said
“a good case can be made that the Landis Deanship, fragmented as it was,
marked a watershed in the history of the Law School, a propelling thrust into
the modern era, where law is perceived . . . not only [as] a reﬂection, but [as] a
shaper, of the needs and ideals of the time and the place.”44 Concrete progress
aside, Landis is a symbol of Harvard’s evolution.
Professor O’Brien advances Landis as another symbol. In O’Brien’s skilled
hands, Landis becomes the moral compass of the ﬁnancial class. No one
can seriously argue that bankers should continue to ignore the sometimes
ruinous social costs of their business. Moral responsibility, in its broad sense,
must become part of securities trading. O’Brien chose an able and articulate
prophet for that truth. O’Brien, however, tacks too much onto his hero’s
resume. Landis does not belong in the pantheon of transformational deans,
despite his lofty intentions. His deanship, as much of his life, is deﬁned by the
gap between potential and practice. Yet despite the rosy lens through which
he views Landis, Professor O’Brien has written a valuable contribution to
regulatory thought and a useful memory of a diﬃcult life.
“For too long Jim Landis—he of the deep piercing eyes and furrowed brow—
has been a forgotten ﬁgure at the Harvard Law School.”45 That is still true. He
has much to teach, in his ideas but more in his failings, where we learn that
promise does not always translate—that brilliance is not everything. Harvard
Law School would do well to hang that reminder on its walls.

44.
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